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Abstract 
NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Jurisic announced the issuing of guideline judgments in appropriate 
cases - role of guideline judgments and reasons for its introduction - Court responding to public opinion 
regarding sentences - possibility of eroding judicial independence and undermining discretion - dangers in 
the guidelines themselves. 
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STRUCTURING DISCRETION: 
SENTENCING IN THE JURISIC AGE 
DONNA SPEARS' 
On 12 October 1998, the Court of Criminal Appeal headed by new Chief 
Justice Spigelman ushered in a new phase in the history of sentencing in New 
South Wales. In R v Jurisic,1 tne Court announced that from now on it will, in 
appropriate cases, issue guideline judgments. On 13 October 1998, the Chief 
Justice in an article written for and published in the Daily Telegraph labelled 
this approach as "innovative and different". These guideline judgments 
represent a departure from the traditional system of sentencing principles 
developed through appellate review and involve the adoption of a more 
structured approach. However, the introduction of such guidelines may also be 
seen by some as an unacceptable engagement by the judiciary with populist 
views and as an institutional acknowledgment of a law and order crisis. A wider 
question is whether the judiciary is the appropriate body to implement 
community concern, and whether such judicial activism creates an unacceptable 
tension between the role of parliament and the proper functioning of the 
judiciary. 
I. THE DECISION IN R v JURISIC 
Mr Jurisic (the respondent) pleaded guilty in the Local Court to three counts 
of dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm in contravention of 
s 52A(3)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Each of the three counts related to a 
separate victim. He was committed for sentencing to the District Court where 
the following sentences were imposed: 
Count 1: sentenced to minimum term of nine months with an additional term 
of nine months, both terms to be served by way of home detention. A licence 
disqualification period of 12 months was also imposed. 
* BA(Hons), LLM(Hons); Barrister. 
R v lurisic [1998] NSWSC 597 (12 October 1998). 
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Counts 2 and 3: on each count, pursuant to s 558 of the Crimes Act, sentence 
deferred upon respondent entering into a recognisance himself in the sum of 
$1,000 to be of good behaviour for a period of two years and to accept 
supervision of the Probation and Parole service. 
The Crown appealed on the grounds that the sentences imposed were 
inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the 
sentence imposed below on the first count, and sentenced the respondent to 
imprisonment for two years comprising a minimum term of one year and an 
additional term of one year. A licence disqualification period of two years was 
also ordered. 
In passing judgment, the Full Bench of the Court of Criminal Appeal issued 
the first guideline for New South Wales, which read as follows: 
(1) A non-custodial sentence for an offence against s 52A should be exceptional and 
almost invariably confined to cases involving momentary inattention or 
misjudgment. 
(2) With a plea of guilty, wherever there is. present to a material degree any 
aggravating factor involving the conduct of the offender, a custodial sentence 
(minimum plus additional or fixed term) of less than three years (in the case of 
dangerous driving causing death) and less than two years (i~ the case of dangerous 
driving causing grievous bodily harm) should be exceptional. 
A list of aggravating factors, including, inter alia, speed and degree of 
intoxication, was provided by Chief Justice Spigelman. 
II. INTRODUCING GUIDELINES 
Spigelman CJ, in his leading jUdgment, indicated clearly that: 
guideline judgments should now be recognised in New South Wales as having a 
useful role to play in ensuring that an appropriate balance exists between the broad 
discretion that must be retained to ensure that justice is done in each individual case, 
on the one hand, and the desirability of consistency in sentencing and the 
maintenance of public confidenpe in sentences actually imposed, and in the 
judiciary as a whole, on the other. 
This notion of guideline judgments is derived from the pre-1998 guideline 
judgments issued by the English Court of Appeal.4 After referring with approval 
to Dunn LJ in R v De Havilland,5 Spigelman CJ said: 
The existence of multiple objectives in sentencing - rehabilitation, denunciation and 
deterrence - permits individual judges to reflect quite different penal philosophies. 
2 Ibid at 37, per Spigelman CJ. 
3 Ibid at 14-15. 
4 H Donnelly, "Guideline judgments: from tariffs to starting points" (1998) 5 Criminal Law News 93. 
5 (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 109 at 114. 
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This is not a bad thing in a field in which "the only golden rule is that there is no 
golden rule": [see R v Geddes (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 554 at 554-5, per Jordan eJ]. 
Indeed, judges reflect the wide range of differing views on such matters that exists 
in the community. However, there are limits to the permissible range of variation. 
The courts must show that they are responsive to public criticism of the outcome of 
sentencing processes. Guideline judgm~ts are a mechanism for structuring 
discretion, rather than restricting discretion. 
III. ASSESSING THE NEED FOR GUIDELINE JUDGMENTS 
The Chief Justice observed that "[s]ignificant disparity between public 
opinion and judicial sentencing will eventually lead to a reduction in the 
perceived legitimacy of the legal system".7 He also suggested that "[p]ublic 
criticism of particular sentences for inconsistency or excessive leniency is 
sometimes justified". 8 The recognition of this situation is the justification for 
the introduction of a corrective measure: the guideline judgment. 
This explicit acknowledgement by a court that some public criticism of 
sentencing disparity is warranted is remarkable. Traditionally, the courts have 
taken the view that they should not be swayed by public opinion from their duty 
to administer justice fairly and impartially, nor be influenced by the tide of 
public opinion generally. However, it is clear that the courts should not stand 
aloof from the community that they serve. As Justice Michael Kirby has 
observed: 
Judges are there to give dispassionate decisions, uninfluenced by the strong forces 
that can rise and swell and then retreat again in popular opinion. It is a feature of 
our time that our political institutions tend to live from day to day. It will be, I 
think, an unhappy development if the courts were equally prone to respond in that 
way to passing political fancies. By the same token, the courts serve the community 
of citizens of whom they are members and it is important for them to be aware of 
changing moral, social, tech~ological values in the community and, in a general 
sense, keep up with the times. 
The proposed use of guideline judgments is consonant with this balancing 
exercise. 
The other interesting feature of the judgment in lurisic is that the Court is 
responding to public opinion as manifested in the media. Although some 
academic authors have doubted the existence of a discrete and discernible body 
of sentiment known as public opinion regarding policy related issues in crime 
6 Note 1 supra at 17, per Spigelman. 
7 Ibid at 20. 
8 Ibid at 17. 
9 Quoted in an interview in G Sturgess and P Chubb, Judging the World: Law and Politics in the World's 
Leading Courts, Butterworths (1988) p 370. 
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and justice,IO it is clear that the Court is concerned to explain and justify its 
decision-making process. 
Adams J in his judgment notes a need for caution in courts addressing public 
perceptions: 
[W]hilst the Courts must do everything in their power so to act that public 
confidence is maintained, and whilst the importance of public perceptions must be 
accepted (and without resentment or patronising) we must treat with care assertions 
about what might be the public perception about this or that issue. Nor can 
publicity about a particular case or cases deflect a Court ever from doing justice 
according to law. To do so would be, amongst other things, to betray the trust that 
the overwhelming majority of 8itizens place in the Courts to stand as a bulwark 
against prejudice and unreason. 
IV. ERODING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE? 
Spigelman CJ notes that in Victoria guideline judgments were not 
implemented because, it is reported, of resistance by judges of the Supreme 
Court. A significant question to be addressed is: does structuring sentencing 
discretion amount to restricting judicial discretion? This is a corollary to the 
larger question as to whether restricting discretion in sentencing undermines 
judicial independence and accountability. 
As to this latter question, Tonry has referred with approval to Ashworth'sl2 
argument that: 
it is a confusion to conflate protection of the judge's power, within applicable law, 
to decide the facts of individual disputes and apply the law to them - a process at 
the core of judicial independence - with protection of the judge's preferences1lo set 
sentences free from standards that might constrain [the] exercise of discretion. 
The restriction of discretion in sentencing does not automatically undermine 
judicial independence. 
In downplaying the impact of guidelines on judicial discretion, the Court 
emphasised the continuity between statements of sentencing principle and 
guideline judgments: 
This court, like other courts of criminal appeal, has frequently stated principles of 
general application with respect to appropriate sentences for particular offences. 
Such statements have, in part, the characteristics of a guideline judgment. The 
10 See, for example, AM Durham m, "Public Opinion Regarding Sentences for Crime: Does it Exist?" 
(1993) 21 Journal o/Criminal Justice 1. 
II Note I supra at 3-4, per Adams 1. 
12 AI Ashworth, "Sentencing Reform Structures" in M Tonry (ed), Crime and Justice: A Review of 
Research, University of Chicago Press (volume 16, 1992) 181. 
13 M Tonry, "Sentencing Reform Across National Boundaries" in C Clarkson and R Morgan (eds), The 
Politics of Sentencing Reform, Clarendon Press (1995) 267 at 273. 
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formal step of recognising that the Court d9.~s issue such guidelines is a logical 
development of what the Court has long done. 
This claim that guideline judgments already form part of the practice of the 
Court of Criminal Appeal is a way for the Court to take ownership of the 
otherwise English concept of the guideline judgment. It is also an answer to the 
criticism that the creation of guideline judgments involves the judiciary in a non-
judicial function that is properly the role of parliament. As Wood J observed: 
By tagging selected decisions as' guideline judgments, the Court is not to be taken as 
usurping the function of the legislature, or as inappropriately intruding into the 
exercise of the sentencing discretion reserved to trial judges. Rather, what is 
intended is for the Court of Criminal Appeal to highlight the sentencing principles 
which fall for it to determine, in a way that might assist trial judges, the DPP and 
trial counsel, and reduce the occasion for thahdegree of inconsistency or departure 
from principle that is an indicator of injustice. 
v. DANGERS IN GUIDELINES THEMSELVES 
One problematic aspect of the lurisic decision is the presumption by the Court 
that the creation of guidelines will be usually prompted by Crown appeals. The 
purpose of Crown appeals is to correct manifestly inadequate sentences. 16 
Therefore, guideline judgments developed in such a context will be used to set 
higher sentencing benchmarks. It is troubling that Spigelman CJ observed: 
A guideline judgment is more likely to arise in the context of a Crown appeal than 
in the context of an appeal against severity by an offender. In the usual case it will 
be the Director of Public Prosecutions who draws the attention of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal to the background circumstances, in terms of inconsistency of 
judgments and other matters, which may makY7it desirable to promulgate a guideline 
judgment with respect to a particular offence. 
If the stated purpose of the introduction of guideline judgments is to maintain 
public confidence by reducing public criticism of disparate sentences, then it is 
not axiomatic that such guidelines can only arise from Crown appeals. 
Logically, unduly harsh sentences in individual cases may equally threaten the 
integrity of the legal system, by showing that the system is harsh and capricious. 
It is troubling that the mindset of the Court is already geared towards Crown 
appeals as providing the building blocks of guideline judgments. 
Perhaps it is for this reason that the Attorney-General has announced 
legislative reform18 that will enable to the Court of Criminal Appeal, on the 
14 Note 1 supra at 9. per Spigelrnan CJ. 
15 Ibidat2.perWoodJ. 
16 Everett v The Queen; Phillips v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295. 
17 Note 1 supra at 19. per Spigelrnan CI. 
18 Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sentencing Guidelines) Act 1998 (NSW) see especially the new s 26 
inserted into the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). 
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application of the Attorney-General, to issue guidelines as free standing 
documents; that is, guidelines that are not related to particular appeal cases. 
However, this legislation is inherently dangerous, both because it blurs the 
distinction between the executive and the judiciary and because it may prove to 
be unworkable. 19 
It is also interesting that the first guideline judgment involved dangerous 
driving occasioning death or grievous bodily harm. The original s 52A, which 
was inserted into the Crimes Act and operative from 6 November 1951, was 
introduced because of the reluctance of the courts to convict drivers of 
manslaughter in the factual circumstances envisaged by the section.2o It would 
be ironic if the effect of the lurisic guideline was to reduce the number of 
convictions. This could occur in two ways; first by jurors becoming aware of the 
new sentencing guideline and declining to convict, or secondly by accused 
persons declining to plead guilty to such a charge on the basis of the perceived 
limited discretion to impose other than a custodial sentence. 
VI. SETTING A NEW DIRECTION FOR SENTENCING 
The adoption of guidelines by the Court in lurisic is a move tailored to meet 
modem concerns about perceived disparity and undue leniency in sentencing. 
These concerns are by no means new to New South Wales or indeed to common 
law jurisdictions. One international commentator, Michael Tonry, has observed 
that sentencing reformers whatever their jurisdiction must all confront the 
"antipodean twins" of discretion and disparity.21 Guideline judgments appear to 
be an acceptable way of structuring sentencing discretion without unduly 
intruding on judicial discretion. 
But perhaps the true significance of the decision in lurisic is that it is an 
example of a modem court challenging the unspoken conformity principle of the 
common law. Judges have traditionally eschewed controversy or media 
attention. Through the co-ordinated release of the judgment and the publication 
of ari article by the Chief Justice in a major daily newspaper, the Court is 
actively seeking to capture the public interest and take ownership of and 
responsibility for sentencing policy, which has so long been the bastard child of 
public policy. This engagement with the media represents an interesting 
development in the history of the New South Wales judiciary. For: 
When judges begin talking to the media ... they are trying to create more informed 
public discussion, they are searclJ~ng for understanding, they are making themselves 
in some sense more accountable. 
19 For more detail as to these cogent criticisms by commentators including the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the Senior Public Defender see E McWilliams, "Sentencing guidelines: who should be 
the arbiter, the judiciary or parliament?" (1998) 36(11) Law Society Journal 48. 
20 Attorney-General v Bindoff(1953) 53 SR (NSW) 489 at 490, per Owen J. 
21 Tonry, note 13 supra at 268. 
22 Sturgess and Chubb, note 9 supra at 180. 
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Such moves towards institutional accountability and openness by courts are to 
be applauded. The move to guideline judgments is, as Adams J in lurisic 
observes, an example of a modern court bringing "to notice a basic conception 
that underlies the recognition of the fundamental im~ortance of the rule .of law in 
a liberal democracy and our attempts to maintain it". 3 
23 Note 1 supra at 4, per Adams J. 
